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NOTES
PROXIMATE CAUSE, SETTLEMENT, LAST CLEAR
CHANCE, STANDARD OF. CARE IN
EMERGENCIES
In Moreland v Stone, 297 Ky 521, 166 S.W (2d) 998
(1942), the holding in the case is based upon the following set
of facts assumed to be in evidence One Larrison was driving a
truck on the sixteen feet wide highway between Winchester and
Irvine, Kentucky Just as he was approaching a left curve in
the road, one Snowden started around hun in another truck.
The court assumes from the evidence that Snowden was already
alongside Larrison when the defendant appeared, coming from
the opposite direction. On discovery by defendant of his predicament he believed he would be unable to stop in time to avoid a
collision and there was not adequate space on the highway for all
three. Defendant accordingly turned to the right off the road
onto a cross-road. In doing so he struck an old woman, plaintiff's
intestate, sitting near the highway in a chair and killed her
instantly
Plaintiff sued Stone and Snowden jointly for
damages for wrongful death, but before trial he settled with
Snowden for the nominal sum of $100 and prosecuted the action
against defendant Stone only Defendant obtained from the trial
court an emergency instruction to the jury under which the jury
exonerated defendant from liability for negligence. The theory
was that, being faced with an emergency, he used the ordinary
care that a prudent man should exercise when faced with a
similar emergency and so was not liable for the result.'
The writer of this note has not seen the record, but he is
informed by the courtesy of one of the attorneys in the case that
the evidence was not reported officially and that the trial judge
declined his help in making up the bystander's bill. Accordingly
the attorney for each side wrote out and submitted the facts
which, he considered were established by the evidence. The court
thereupon incorporated both statements in the bill of exceptions.
IEvans, Standardof Care %nEmergenczes (1943) 31 Ky. L. J. 207.
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The plaintiff settled before trial with Snowden for a
nominal sum in the belief that the evidence would show that
Snowden was not alongside Larrison but had only started around
and was dropping back. The inference, then, is that defendant
had plenty of space on the highway and that Snowden's conduct
was not sufficient to drive defendant from the road.
Why did not defendant also plead payment by his concurrent tort-feasor, Snowden? He might well anticipate that he
could not establish an emergency One reason may be that he
felt it unwise to plead that he was a tort-feasor, though such a
plea, while formally inconsistent with his claim of nonnegligence, is permissible inasmuch as he cannot in advance
surely know what the evidence will prove. It is also true that
a settlement is not the equivalent of a satisfied judgment. The
defendant Stone paid the sum of $100 in consideration of the
dismissal of himself as a party defendant. This probably should
be construed as a disissal with prejudice. It would seem,
therefore, that Snowden would not be prevented from suing
defendant for contribution, 2 nor would it prevent defendant, m
the event that he should be cast in damages, from suing
Snowden for contribution. Perhaps defendant exercised the
better strategy, especially since plaintiff's case turned out as it
did. If defendant and Snowden were joint tort-feasors, each
would be liable individually for the whole loss, inasmuch as
3
damages for wrongful death are not apportionable.
It seems that defendant did not plead contributory negligence properly to interpose it as a defense. One is surprised
that it was not pleaded. The court intimates that there is no
evidence of it. Yet the evidence most favorable to her placed
the decedent, an old woman of 86, at some 8 to 10 feet from the
road, sitting in a chair. After the court held that contributory
negligence was not properly pleaded and had decided to give the
emergency instruction, plaintiff asked for a last clear chance
instruction, because he considered that the emergency instruction
given permitted the jury to believe that the decedent was too
close to the highway There was no pleading directly in support
of the emergency instruction but that has been held to be un-

IK. R. S. sec.

412.030.

'See PRossEs, TORTS (1941) 330.
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necessary 4 Plaintiff, however, was misled in his belief 5 that the
emergency instruction is a novelty in Kentucky, 6 his contention

being probably that it was new in this factual situation.
The problem of causation was not discussed by the court.
The evidence was conflicting. Defendant attempted to show that
Snowden was beside Larrison at' the time defendant turned
from the highway, that defendant was travelling 30 miles per
hour; that Snowden and Larrison were driving at 30-35 miles
per hour; and that defendant saw the two trucks when he was
only 40 feet away from them on the apex of the curve, when he
put on his brakes and left the road, going up a side road which
intersected the main highway at that point. Plaintiff's evidence
was to the effect that Snowden had only started around Larrison
and that he was dropping back and that, therefore, there was no
occasion for defendant to leave the road, that even if decedent
were closer to the highway than was prudent, yet defendant had
the last clear chance to avoid the catastrophe if he had exercised
the care which due prudence demanded. The act of Snowden
was (a) either the direct and unbroken cause 7 or (b) defendant's
act was a dependent intervening cause which was foreseeable by
Snowden.8 For the consequence of this intervening act defendant was not liable, due to the emergency Plaintiff, however,
denies the proposition that Snowden's act was causal. It was
only the occasion for defendant leaving the highway It was
negligent of defendant, he asserts, to fail to observe that
Snowden was falling back behind the other truck. 9
This case is interesting in many ways, first, because of the
condition of the record as it came to the appellate court, then
because of the settlement which, as matters turned out, prevented plaintiff from continuing the suit against Snowden for
substantial damages, and finally, because of the possible elements
of contributory negligence which defendant failed to plead and
' McKeever v. Batcheler, 219 Iowa 93, 257 N. W 567 (1934).

Cf. Evans, supra note 1, at note 6.

'Moreland v. Stone, 292 Ky. 521, at 525.
See Louisville Taxicab Co. v. Ramey, 222 Ky. 286, 288, 300

S. W 890, 891 (1928).

'See Scott v. Shepherd, 2 W B1. 892, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (K. B.
1773).
:See RESTATEMENT, TORTS, sec. 443.
'See RESTATEMENT, TORTS, sees. 431-435, 440-443.
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the last clear chance, of which plaintiff was not allowed to make
use. There appears tobe no reason why plaintiff's request for
a last clear chance instruction should not have been given, in
view of the sharp conflict in testimony This is one more of the
growing list of cases involving the emergency doctrine.
Alvin E. Evans

